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Dyer: Hazardous Waste and the Innocent Purchaser

NOTES
HAZARDOUS WASTE AND THE INNOCENT
PURCHASER
I.

INTRODUCTION

2

Florida' and federal statutes impose strict liability on landowners for the
abatement of hazardous waste on their land.3 Landowners may be liable for
the cleanup of hazardous substances despite their lack of involvement in the
waste disposal or knowledge of its presence on their land.4 As many real estate
developers have recently discovered, the mere purchase of property can lead to
major cleanup liability.- The cost of mitigating even minor hazardous waste
problems very often far exceeds the value of the property.6 The consequences

of discovering hazardous waste on purchased property can thus be substantial.
Innocent purchasers 7 of undeveloped, commercial, industrial, and residential
real estate assume the risk of purchasing unbargained-for exposure to millions
of dollars of waste-related liability." Placing this burden upon innocent purL. Florida Resource Recovery and Management Act, FLA. STAT. SS 403.701-.73 (1985). This
note focuses on the interaction of Florida law with federal law and its role in the cleanup of
hazardous waste. The discussion and analysis is, however, relevant without regard to state jurisdictional boundaries. Many other states have statutes creating liability for the abatement of hazardous waste to which the principles discussed in this note are applicable. See infra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text.
2. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. SS 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 66-78.
4. See 42 U.S.C. S 9607 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); FL.. STAT. S 403.727 (1985. Most cases
imposing liability for hazardous waste abatement have involved generators, transporters, and disposers of hazardous waste rather than innocent purchasers. Commentators, however, interpret these
statutes to impose liability on innocent landowners. See Bleicher & Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The
Impact of Superfund and Related Laws on Real Estate Transactions, 14 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.)
10,017, at 10,017-19 (1984); Comment, 7he Hazardous Waste Abatemrent Liability of Innocent Landowners:
A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 17 PAc. L.J. 185, 185 (1985); Varnum & Achterman, Toxic Waste Liability:
A Risk in Acquisitions, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 28, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
5. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Mardan Corp.
v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp.
1055 (D.NJ. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). See generally Varnum & Achterman, supra
note 4, at 15, col. 2.
6. See Bleicher & Stonelake, supra note 4, at 10,017. For an analysis of the costs involved
in cleaning up a hazardous waste site, see Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94
HARv. L. REv. 584, 585-87 (1981).
7. For purposes of this discussion, an innocent purchaser of real estate is one not involved
in hazardous waste disposal who purchased the property without actual knowledge of the hazardous
substances on the property.
8. The average cost of a cleanup at Superfund sites during 1984-1985 was $12-413 million.
Address by Stephen D. Ramsey, Sidley & Austin, Washington, D.C., at University of Florida
College of Law (Feb. 18, 1986); see alsoVarnum & Achterman, supra note 4, at 15, col. 1.
"Superfund" is the common name for the federal trust fund established to finance the cleanup of
hazardous substances. See infia text accompanying notes 21-25.
253
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chasers serves environmental interests by providing cleanup funds. 9 The downside of liability is the imposition of undue hardship on parties who never
participated in the creation or disposal of hazardous waste.10 Hazardous waste
law is complex and fraught with conflict, inconsistency and uncertainty. Even
the most prudent purchasers cannot confidently acquire property free of potential
hazardous waste liability.
This note analyzes the innocent purchaser's plight upon discovering hazardous waste on his newly acquired property. The analysis begins with an
overview of statutory liability imposed through governmental cleanups and cost
recovery actions. The overview turns to a discussion of statutory affirmative
defenses and contribution remedies available to an innocent purchaser. The
note then discusses the doctrine of caveat emptor and its effect on the vendor's
duty to disclose hazardous waste. After a discussion of potential causes of action
an innocent purchaser has against prior owners, the note analyzes the policy
behind holding an innocent purchaser liable for cleanup costs. Finally, the note
discusses and recommends protective legislation to safeguard the public's environmental interests as well as the interests of the individual landowner.
II.

STATUTORY

A.

LIABILITY

CER CLA

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA)" is the primary mechanism forcing the cleanup of hazardous
waste.' 2 Congress enacted CERCLA on December 11, 1980 after heated debate
and last minute compromise.' 3 The bill was drafted and hastily enacted' 4 in
9. See infra text accompanying notes 230-32.
10. See infra text accompanying note 228.
11. 42 U.S.C. SS 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
12. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) considers the improper maragement of toxic substances to be the nation's most serious environmental problem. Hazardous
Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084
(1980). Health and environmental problems associated with improper hazardous waste disposal are
numerous and severe. See 126 CONG. REC. 26,337 (1980) (statement by Representative Florio); id.
at 26,339 (statement by Representative Staggers); id. at 30,937 (statement by Senator Moynihan
on the Love Canal incident). Many members of Congress spoke on problems facing their states
and districts arising from improper hazardous waste disposal. See id. at 26,336-61 (House debate
on H.R. 85 and H.R. 7020, predecessor bills to CERCLA); id. at 30,897-987 (Senate debate on
CERCLA); id. at 31,950-82 (House debate on CERCLA).
13. See Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D.
Fla. 1984) ("CERCLA's legislative history is riddled with uncertainty . . . last minute compromises
forced changes that went largely unexplained"); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109
(D.N.J. 1983) ("CERCLA . . . was hastily, and, therefore, inadequately drafted. . . . [L]ast
.
minute changes in the bill were inserted with little or no explanation."); cf CERCLA, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. SS 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. If 1984)).
For a review of CERCLA's legislative history, see Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous
Waste Control, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 253 (1981); Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. I
(1982); Note, Liability for Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms,
69 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1056-58 (1981).
14. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1051 (D. Ariz. 1984);
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the wake of the Love Canal controversy.' 5 CERCLA was designed to bring
order to an array of partly redundant and inadequate federal laws governing
hazardous substance cleanup and compensation.' 6 CERCLA's precursor, the
Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),' 7 established a "cradleto-grave" regulatory scheme for newly-created hazardous waste. RCRA, however, was ill-equipped to regulate the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste
sites.' 8 While RCRA authorized the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to require continuous monitoring of ongoing disposal sites, the 1976 Act applied
only to those inactive sites posing an imminent hazard.'9 CERCLA cured many
of RCRA's deficiencies by establishing a means of managing both governmental
20
and private responses to abandoned and inactive disposal sites.

Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589. F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984);
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983). Courts attempting to construe

CERCLA have criticized Congress for enacting the bill hastily without providing sufficient guidelines
for determining the scope and intent of the legislation. &e United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 839 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("The courts are once
again placed in the undesirable and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation.");
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1984) ("Because of the haste with which
CERCLA was enacted, Congress was not able to provide a clarifying committee report, thereby
making it extremely difficult to pinpoint the intended scope of the legislation."); United States v.
Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[CERCLA's language] leaves much to be
desired from a syntactical standpoint, perhaps a reflection of the hasty compromises which were
reached as the bill was pushed through Congress just before the close of its 96th Session.").
15. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1051 (D. Ariz. 1984);
Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984). The
"Love Canal" incident is probably the most infamous environmental disaster associated with hazardous waste disposal. See Comment, Private Right of Action to Recover Cleanup Costs from Superfund,
49 ALB. L. REV. 616, 616 n.2 (1985). It involved the disposal of highly toxic organic waste in a

Niagara Falls, New York, community by Hooker Chemical Co. Bulk Distribution, 589 F. Supp. at
1441 n.9. The release caused 306 families to abandon their homes. 126 CONG. REC. 30,939 (1980)
(statement of Senator Moynihan). The resulting damage was so severe that it became the first nonnatural disaster to be declared a national disaster. Comment, Generator Liability Under Superfund for
Cleanup of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1229, 1231 n.16 (1982). See
generally M. BROWN,

LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA By Toxic CHEMICALS

LEVINE, LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND PEOPLE

(1980); A.

(1982).

16. See F.

ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
(1984).
42 U.S.C. SS 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. II 1984), amended by 42 U.S.C. SS 6901-6987

POLICY 568

17.

(1982 & Supp. II 1984). RCRA was enacted in 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, and
substantially amended by the Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-

482, 94 Stat. 2334. RCRA established a regulatory scheme for newly-created hazardous waste. See
H.R. RE. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6119, 6120. RCRA was characterized at the time of enactment as a "prospective cradle to grave

regulatory regime governing the movement of hazardous waste in our society." Goldfarb, The
Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 249, 253 (1979).
18. Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla.
1984); see also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 839
(W.D. Mo. 1984); Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some
Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 260, 265-67 (1981).

19.

H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.

CODE CONG.

&

AD. NEWS 6119, 6120.
20. Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla.

1984); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983); City of
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CERCLA's most significant feature is the "Hazardous Substance Response
Trust Fund,"' commonly known as Superfund. Superfund provides money for
cleanup efforts and is financed primarily through an excise tax imposed on the
oil and chemical industries.2 2 CERCLA authorizes the federal governmente' to
use Superfund to finance remedial or abatement action when a release or substantial threat of a release of hazardous substance 4 poses an imminent and
25
substantial danger to the public health or welfare.
The EPA has primary responsibility for managing the cleanup of hazardous
substances.2 6 The EPA's activities are guided by the National Oil and Hazardous
Substance Contingency Plan (NCP) 7 Sites in urgent need of governmental
response are included on a "national priorities list" which identifies priority
28
sites for Superfund-financed remedial action.
Limited Superfund monies cannot cover the cost of all hazardous waste
cleanups.2 9 To accommodate the deficiency, CERCLA provides for civil actions
against parties potentially responsible for a release of hazardous substances.:"'
These authorized civil suits include cost recovery actions under section 9607(a)"
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982); H.R. REP. No.
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6119, 6125.
21. See 42 U.S.C. S 9631 (1982). The original funding for the Hazardous Substance Response
Trust Fund was $1.6 billion. See id. (discussing sources of funds). A recent appropriation of $900
million from the Treasury was made in 1985. Department of Housing & Urban Development Independent Agencies Appropriation Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-160, 99 Stat. 909, 916 (1985). A
portion of that appropriation was designated payable in advance. Act of Apr. 1, 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-270, 100 Stat. 80.
CERCLA also establishes a Post-Closure Liability Trust Fund. 42 U.S.C. S 9641 (1982). This
second fund assumes the liability of owners or operators of facilities that have received permits
under RCRA. Id. S 9607(kXI).
22. 42 U.S.C. S 9631(bXl)(A) (1982).
23. CERCLA expressly delegates authority to the President. Id. S 9604(a). However, the
President has transferred most of that authority to EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed.
Reg. 42,237 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,286, 46 Fed. Reg. 9901 (1981).
24. In defining the term "hazardous substance," CERCLA incorporates by reference the
substances designated as hazardous or toxic under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. SS 1317(a) &
1321(bX2XA); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. S 6921; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. $
7412; and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2606. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9601(14)
(1982). The Act also authorizes the EPA to designate additional substances that "may present
substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment." Id. S 9602(a).
25. 42 U.S.C. S 9604 (1982).
26. See supra note 23.
27. 42 U.S.C. S 9604(aXl) (1982); see National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. SS 300.1-.81
(1985) (describing methods of response to hazardous waste problems and setting forth guidelines
for the appropriate roles of state and federal agencies and private parties). The EPA promulgated
the NCP for the purpose of effectuating "response powers and responsibilities." Id. S 300.1.
28. 42 U.S.C. S 9605(8XB); see 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1985).
29. As of December 31, 1984, EPA had identified 19,368 hazardous waste sites potentially
subject to CERCLA. Of these, 780 have been designated as priority clean-up targets. See Varnum
& Achterman, supra note 4, at 15, cols. 1-2.
30. 42 U.S.C. SS 9606, 9607 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
31. Section 9607(a) provides in full:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
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and abatement actions under section 9606(a).5 2 Four general categories of persons are strictly liable' for the release or threatened release of hazardous substances: (1) present owners or operators of facilities; "4 (2) owners or operators
of facilities at the time of disposal;35 (3) persons who generate waste or arrange
for its transportation or disposal:3 and (4) persons who transport the material
to disposal or treatment facilities.3 7 "Facility" is broadly defined to include any
area where a hazardous substance is deposited. 8
Under CERCLA, innocent purchasers may be held strictly liable for cleanup

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substances owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there is a
release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government
or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.
Id. 5 9607(a).
32. Section 9606(a) provides in full:
(a) In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the
President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of
a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United
States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the
district court of the United States in the district in which the threat occurs shall have
jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may
require. The President may also, after notice to the affected State, take other action under
this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect
public health and welfare and the environment.
Id. 5 9606(a).
33. Se infra text accompanying notes 68-78.
34. 42 U.S.C. 5 9607(aXl) (1982).
35. Id. 5 9607(aX2).
36. Id. 5 9607(aX3).
37. Id. 5 9607(aX4).
38. Id. 5 9601(9). According to CERCLA:
(9) "facility"

means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipe-

line (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond,
lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or
aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored,
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer
product in consumer use or any vessel . ...
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costs simply as a result of their status as facility owners.3" CERCLA does not
distinguish among responsible parties on the basis of relative fault. 4o Thus,
innocent purchasers stand just as culpable as the actual generators and disposers
of hazardous substances.
Liability under CERCLA is subject to three limited defenses, which the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 4 1 A defendant must
establish that the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance and
the resulting damages were caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or
an act or omission of a third party. 2 The third party defense is not available
when the third party is the defendant's employee or agent or is in a direct or
indirect contractual relationship with the defendant. 43 To utilize the third party
defense, the defendant must show he exercised due care and took precautions
44
against all foreseeable third party acts and omissions.
In addition to EPA-initiated cost recovery actions and abatement injunctions,
CERCLA allows private parties to recover the response costs of a private
cleanup. 45 The courts have limited private relief to cost recovery actions, holding
that injunctive relief is available only to governmental agencies. 46 Like most
sections of CERCLA, the provisions establishing the third party defense and
private cause of action are ambiguous and confusing. 47 The availability of either
to an innocent purchaser has not been clearly established,48 and the courts
49
addressing those issues have reached conflicting results.
B.

RRMA

Following the enactment of CERCLA, many states enacted similar laws
which impose liability upon landowners for hazardous waste on their land.)
39. See infra text accompanying notes 68-78.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76.
41. 42 U.S.C. S 9607(b) (1982).
42.

Id.

43. Id. S 9607(b)(3).
44. Id.
45. See id. S 9607(a).
46. See, e.g., Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 15 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENVTL.
L. INsT.) 20,103, at 20,105 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 1984).
47. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 95-118 (discussing affirmative defenses), 177-207 (discussing private causes of action).
49. Compare New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting thirdparty defense in case involving continued waste dumping) with United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENmL.
L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (allowing third-party defense when
some cleanup was undertaken); compare Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (permitting an innocent purchaser's suit against the vendor) and City
of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (permitting a potentially
liable claimant to recover cleanup costs from a responsible party) with Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C.
Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984) (applying the clean hands doctrine to deny recovery
by a plaintiff who contributed to the waste deposit) and D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp.
248 (D.N.J. 1983) (dismissing suit because insufficient proof presented that plaintiff was not liable).
50. E.g., Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, ch. 121, 1983 Minn. Laws..
(codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. SS 115B.01-.24 (West Supp. 1986)); Virginia Waste Management
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CERCLA's drafters envisioned cooperative state and federal implementation,
however, CERCLA accords states flexibility in developing their own superfunds. 5 Some states developed state superfunds simply to participate in federal
cleanup expenditures by guaranteeing matching funds.5 2 CERCLA encourages
states to develop their own response authority with the promise of reimbursement from the federal Superfund for authorized cleanups. 53 States may also
initiate response actions without federal authorization, a probable alternative
given the enormity of the hazardous waste disposal problem.54
Florida's counterpart to CERCLA, the Resource Recovery and Management
Act (RRMA), 5 incorporates RCRA's monitoring and regulatory features, as
well as CEROLA's "Superfund" and liability provisions.5 RRMA derives many
of its definitions from CERCLA.5 7 RRMA authorizes the Florida Department
of Environmental Regulation (FDER) 5 to take any action necessary to abate

Act, ch. 492, 1986 Va. Acts (codified as VA. CODE ANN. 55 10-263 to 10-312 (Supp. 1986)); Act
of July 1, 1983, ch. 65, 1983 Wash. Laws (codified at WASH. REv. CODE ANN. SS 70.105A.010
- .905 (Supp. 1986)) (providing state plan to coordinate with CERCLA). For a comprehensive
listing and discussion of various state superfund statutes, see Comment, State Hazardous Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Complement?, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,348 (1983).
See generally Flynn & Houlihan, Illinois "Superfund": The Legislature Initiates a Hazardous Substances
Cleanup Program, 72 ILL. B.J. 574 (1984); Ulen, Hester & Johnson, Minnesota's Environmental Response
and Liability Act: An Economic Justification, 15 ENvmL. L. REP. (EmVrL. L. INST.) 10,109 (1985).
51. See 42 U.S.C. S 9604(c) (1982); see also Comment, supra note 50, at 10,349. See generally
Note, The Preemptive Scope of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980: Necessity for an Active State Role, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 635 (1982) (recognizing that cooperation
may be thwarted by CERCLA's ambiguities).
52. See Comment, supra note 50, at 10,348. The EPA will not take remedial action in a state
unless the state has entered a cooperative agreement or contract with the President. These agreements must provide that the state will (1) maintain removal and remedial actions for their expected
lives, (2) provide acceptable disposal facilities for hazardous substances removed from the site, and
(3) assure payment of 10% of the costs of remedial actions, including all future maintenance, or
at least 50% of the costs of remedial actions taken at sites owned by the state or its political
subdivisions. 42 U.S.C. S 9604(cX1) (1982).
53. See Comment, supra note 50, at 10,348.
54. For a discussion of preemption problems posed by CERCLA, see Note, supra note 51.
55. FLA. STAT. SS 403.701-.73 (1985).
56. RRMA predates the enactment of CERCLA. See Florida Resource Recovery and Management Act, ch. 74-342, 1974 Fla. Laws 1093 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. SS 403.701.73 (1985)). RCRA features of RRMA were supplemented by the Water Quality Assurance Act
of 1983, ch. 83-310, 1983 Fla. Laws 1822. The 1983 Act provided Florida with a state superfund
for hazardous waste abatement. See id. S 84, 1983 Fla. Laws at 1878 (codified at FLA. STAT. S
376.307 (1985)). For a comprehensive discussion of the 1983 legislation, see Hopping & Preston,
The Water Quality Assurance Act of 1983 - Florida's "Great Leap Forward" into Groundwater Protection
and Hazardous Waste Management, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 599 (1983).
57. Compare 42 U.S.C. S 9601 (1982) (definitions) with FiA. STAT. 5 403.703 (1985) (definitions). For example, under RRMA, "hazardous substance" means any substance which is defined
as a hazardous substance in CERCLA. FLA. STAT. S 403.703(29) (1985).
58. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (FDER) was created pursuant to
the Florida Environmental Reorganization Act of 1975, ch. 75-22, 1975 Fla. Laws 42, FDER
assumed those responsibilities previously vested in the Department of Pollution Control. Id.
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caused by a hazardous sub-

6°

Florida's cleanup funding mechanism, the Water Quality Assurance Trust
Fund (Trust),6' resembles the federal Superfund. 62 The Trust is used by FDER
as a nonlapsing revolving fund for carrying out the purposes of RRMA,63 and
is designed primarily to finance cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 64 The Act's
liability section resembles CERCLA's except that it does not provide for private
causes of action. 65 Persons potentially liable for hazardous waste cleanup under
Florida law parallel those liable under federal law. 66 Responsible parties are
liable for all costs of removal and remedial action incurred by FDER.67 An
innocent purchaser of contaminated property is thus subject to liability for abatement whether the cleanup is initiated by federal or state action.
Florida lacks interpretive case authority to guide a purchaser facing potential
liability. The statutory language so closely parallels CERCLA, however, that
Florida courts will likely look to CERCLA decisions for reasoning and interpretation. Unless otherwise distinguished, resolution of relevant CERCLA issues
should provide analysis for comparable state law.

59. An imminent hazard exists when a hazardous substance creates an immediate and substantial danger to the environment or human health, safety, or welfare. FLA. STAT. S 403.726(3)

(1985).
60. Id. $ 403.726(2). As of March, 1986, there were 22 sites throughout Florida being cleaned
up with money from the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund. St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 11,
1986, at 5A, col. 3.
61. FLA. STAT. S 376.307 (1985). In fiscal 1983-1984, FDER spent $6.1 million from the
Trust cleaning up sites and studying others in preparation for cleanup, In 1984-1985, the state
spent $11 million, and in 1985-1986 the state plans to spend $17.4 million. St. Petersburg Times,
Mar. 11, 1986, at IA, col. 2.
62. In addition to the similarities discussed infra text accompanying notes 63-67, both funds
rely largely on excise taxes for their funding. Compare CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. $ 9631(bXA) (1982)
with RRMA, FLA. STAT. S 376.307(5) (1985). The Florida Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund
relies on an initial and subsequent annual transfers from the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund.
See FLA. STAT. S 376.307(3Xa)-(b) (1985). Similarly, Suprfund receives transfers from the trust
fund created under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1321 (1982). See 42 U.S.C. S 9631(b)
(1982).
63. FLA. STAT. S 376.307(4) (1985).
64. Id. 5 376.307(2) (1985). The Trust may be used for federally-authorized or state-initiated
cleanups.
65. See id. S 403.727(4). Under RRMA responsible parties are "liable of all costs of removal
or remedial action incurred by the department under this section and damages for injury to, destruction
of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction,
or loss resulting from the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance." Id. (emphasis
added). Thus, unlike CERCLA, the state act does not provide liability for "any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person." 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a)(IXB) (1982) (emphasis added).
66. Compare 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a) (1982) (persons potentially liable) with FLA. STAT. S 403.727(4)
(1985) (classes of persons liable). Both acts include the present and past owners and operators of
a hazardous waste facility, the transporter and the hazardous waste generator who arranged for
transport, disposal or treatment. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9607(aXl)-(4) (1982); RRMA, FLA.
STAT. S 403.727(4Xa)-(d) (1985); see also supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
67. FLA. STAT. S 403.727(4) (1985). Additionally responsible parties are liable for damages
for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources. Id.
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HAZARD WASTE AND THE INNOCENT PURCHASER

C.

Framework of Liability
1. Strict Liability

Without exception, courts have held CERCLA imposes strict liability upon
those subject to its provisions. 6s An explicit provision for strict liability was not
included in CERCLA. 69 Section 9601(32),71 however, provides that the term
"liability" under CERCLA shall be construed to embrace the standard of liability under section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly
referred to as "the Clean Water Act of 1977"). 7' Courts interpreting CERCLA
have relied on decisions that have uniformly construed section 311 of the Clean
Water Act to embody a strict liability standard, 72 in addition to CERCLA's
legislative history, 73 to reach the strict liability standard. 74 This reading of CERCLA has been widely accepted by commentators 75 and is apparently beyond
dispute.

68. See, e.g., J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp.
1103, 1113 (D.N.J. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio
1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
69. Early House and Senate versions of CERCLA provided for strict as well as joint and

several liability for individuals responsible for discharge of hazardous substances. See S. 1480, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. S 4(a), 126 CoNa. REC. 30,908 (1980), reprinted in I LEoISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE

ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY

AcT

OF

1980

(SUPERFUND)

486 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as CERCLA LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY]; H.R. 7020, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. S 3071(aX1XD), 126 CONG. REc. 26,779 (1980), reprinted in 2 CERCLA LEGISLATrvE
HISTORY, at 438-39. As part of the compromise that facilitated the passage of CERCLA, the sponsors
removed this language and inserted the reference to liability under the Clean Water Act. See 126
CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Senator Randolph), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEOISLATIVE
HISTORY, at 685.
70. 42 U.S.C. S 9601(32) (1982).
71. 33 U.S.C. S 1321 (1982).
72. See, e.g., United States v. MN Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982); United States
v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981);
Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. TaxTow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978); Burgess v. M/V Tomano, 364 F.2d 964 (Ist Cir. 1977).
73. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844
(D.C. Mo. 1984) (citing 126 CONG. REc. S.14,964) (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Senator
Randolph, then Chairman of the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee); 126 CONG.
REc. H.11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Representative Florio)).

74. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 84344 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113 (D.NJ. 1983). Reading

strict liability into the statute is also supported by CERCLA's affirmative defense for due care.
42 U.S.C. S 9607(bX3) (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 95-118. Such a defense would be
rendered meaningless if strict liability were not the standard. See Pice, 577 F. Supp. at 1114; Mintz,
A Response to Rogers, Three Years of Superfund, 14 ENVTL. L.

REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)

10,036, at 10,037

nn. 12-13 (1984).
75. See, e.g., Giblin & Kelly, JudicialDevelopment of Standards of Liability in Government Enforcement
Actions Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensalion and Liabiliy Act, 33

CLEV.

ST. L.

REV. 1, 11-13 (1984); Hall, The Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Waste Management, 38
Bus. LAw. 593, 602 (1983); Mintz, supra note 74, at 10,037; Reed, CERCLA 1985. A Litigation
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Under a strict liability standard, owners, operators, generators and transporters can be liable for cleanup costs based exclusively on their status. The
practical effect for the purchaser of a contaminated site is liability based on
ownership regardless of fault or knowledge. The potential unfairness of this
result has not gone unnoticed.76
In defense of the liability scheme, courts reason that strict liability furthers
CERCLA's legislative goals of spreading costs and assuring that responsible
parties bear the cleanup burden.7 Although strict liability may impose harsh
results on certain defendants, it would be a less equitable alternative to force
taxpayers who bear no responsibility for damage to shoulder cleanup costs. 8
2.

Joint and Several Liability

9

Legal journals and judicial opinionss0 have extensively addressed the scope
of liability under CERGLA. Many federal district courts hold that CEROLA

Update, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvWL. L. INsT.) 10,395, at 10,402 (1985); Note, Hazardous Wastes:
Third Party Compensationfor Contingencies Arising From Inactive and Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal
Sites, 33 S.C.L. REv. 543, 549 (1982).
76. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 n.19 (2d Cir. 1985)
(noting criticism by Representative Broyhill that bill provided for strict liablity of facility owners
without regard to a causal connection to actual release of hazardous substances).
77. See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 75, at 603-04; Mintz, supra note 74, at 10,037-38; Moore &
Kowalski, When is One Generator Liable for Another's Waste?, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 93, 94-102 (1984);
Rogers, Three Years of Superfund, 13 ENvT. L. REP. (EmvrL. L. INST.) 10,361, at 10,362 (1983);
Note, The Right to Contribution for Response Costs Under CERCLA, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 345,
353-56 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to Contribution Under CERCLA]; Note, Apportionment
and Contribution Under the "Superfund" Act, 53 UMKC L. REv. 594, 602-05 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Apportionment and Contribution Under Superfund]; Note, Dividing the Costs of Hazardous Waste
Site Cleanups Under Superfund: Is Joint and Several Liability Appropriate?, 52 UMKC L. REv. 435 (1984);
Note, Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REv. 1157
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Joint and Several Liability Under Superfund]; Casenote, Environmental
Law - Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA: United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 57 TEMP.

L.Q. 885 (1984).
80. See Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Colo. 1985) ("the liability
issue most litigated under [5 9607] has been whether CEROLA provides for joint and several
liability"); United States v. Argent Corp., 14 ENrL. L. REP. (ENmL. L. INST.) 20,497, at 20,497
(D.N.M. May 4, 1984) (legislative history indicates Congress intended for courts to apply traditional
tort law principles of joint and several liability on a case-by-case basis); United States v. Stringfellow,
14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,385, at 20,385 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1984) (legislative
history suggests joint and several liability could be imposed; deletion of language from Act does
not preclude joint and several liability); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposing,
Inc., 14 ENVWL. L. REP. (EVTL. L. INST.) 20,272, at 20,275 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984) (joint and
several liability appropriate to indivisible injury) (CERCLA permits imposition of joint and several
liability at discretion of court); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63
(W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
845 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (joint and several liability available); United States v. A & F Materials
Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill.
1984) (legislative history indicates Congressional intent
that joint and several liability may be imposed at judicial discretion); United States v. Wade, 577
F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (deletion from Act of joint and several liability provision
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imposes joint and several liability where the harm is indivisible.8 ' In most cases,
release of hazardous substances causes a single, indivisible harm.' Joint and
several liability virtually ensures that the government will collect the full cleanup
cost regardless of the insolvency or unavailability of some of the responsible
parties. Proponents of CEROLA claim joint and several liability is both consonant with common law and a practical necessity if the government is to
recover any of its cleanup expenditures. 3 Recovery frequently would be barred
if dependent upon proof of the extent to which each responsible person actually
contributed to the problem."
District courts have been inconsistent in developing criteria for imposing
joint and several liability in hazardous waste cases. Conflict exists over whether
state law or federal common law should apply. "5 The majority of courts have

indicates common law principles apply); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (deletion of joint and several liability provision empowers courts to tailor
liabilty to individual cases).
81. United States v. Argent Corp., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 20,497, at 20,497
(D.N.M. May 4, 1984); United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,385,
at 20,385 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
14 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INsT.) 20,272, at 20,273 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984); United States v.
A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F.
Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808
(S.D. Ohio 1983). In interpreting CERCLA to impose joint and several liability, the courts have
generally looked past the ambiguous language of the statute to the legislative history. See United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (S.D. I1. 1984);
Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 805-06. Early versions of House and Senate bills contained provisions
expressly providing for joint and several liability. See supra note 69. However, critics of CERCLA
maintained that joint and several liability was grossly unfair. See 126 CoNC. Rac. 30,972 (1980)
(statement by Senator Helms). In order to secure the majority necessary for enactment, joint and
several liability was omitted in the final version of CERCLA passed by Congress. See Note, Joint
and Several Liability under Superfund, supra note 79, at 1164.
Despite the deletion of an express provision providing for joint and several liability, every
court addressing the scope of liability has found this standard available. See cases cited supra note
80. The courts have interpreted Congress' deletion of the express joint and several liability provisions
not as a total rejection of joint and several liability but as a rejection only of its mandatory
imposition. See Chem-Dyne, 527 F. Supp. at 806-08. The courts further reason that the Clean Water
Act, on which CERCLA relies to determine its standard of liability, has been construed to impose
joint and several liability. Id. at 809-10. In addition, courts find policy considerations have been
noted as favoring the imposition of joint and several liability, because joint and several liability
ensures that the government will be able to collect in full the costs of cleanup, regardless of whether
some defendants are insolvent. Id. at 806-08. For a thorough discussion of joint and several liability
under CERCLA, see Note, Joint and Several Liability under Superfimd, supra note 79.
82. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. I1. 1984);
Mintz, supra note 74, at 10,037.
83. See Mintz, supra note 74, at 10,037.
84. Id. Under analogous circumstances, the common law developed various forms of joint
and several liability to allow innocent plaintiffs to avoid this practically insurmountable obstacle of
proof. Id. at 10,037-38 (citing Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213
(6th Cir. 1974); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951); Landers v. East
Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952)).
85. Compare United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255-57 (S.D. Ill.
1984) (developing federal common law for application of joint and several liability under CERCLA)
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held development of federal common law is necessary to protect uniquely federal
interests.M These courts, however, have developed different approaches to formulating a federal rule. Most 8 7 follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts" approach, imposing liability for the entire harm where two or more persons cause
a single and indivisible harm.19 If the harm is "divisible" and provides a
reasonable basis for apportionment of damages, each defendant is liable only
for the harm he caused.! ' The defendants bear the burden of proof as to
apportionment.'9
Most decisions imposing joint and several liability involve multiple generator

with United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844-45 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (holding CERCLA defendants jointly and severally liable under principles of state law).
86. See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill.
1984) ("there are compelling reasons for the development of a uniform federal common law in
the area of hazardous waste"); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) ("a uniform federal rule of decision is consistent with the legislative history and policies
of CERCLA and . . . no compelling local interests mandate the incorporation of state law"). But
see United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 845 (W.D.
Ill. 1984) ("the defendants would be jointly and severally liable pursuant to the law of Missouri").
87. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Other courts have taken a
position more in favor of apportioning damages between multiple defendants. In United States v.
A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984), the court rejected the rigid application
of the Restatement imposed by the majority. Instead the court adopted a discretionary approach
allowiig the court the option of apportioning damages regardless of a defendant's success or failure
in proving his proportionate contribution to the total injury. 578 F. Supp. at 1256. The A & F
Matrials court adopted the six criteria from the proposed but not adopted "Gore Amendment" to
CERCLA to be used if a court elects to apportion damages. Id. at 1256. These criteria include:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge, release,
or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment,
storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste
concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with federal, state, or local officials to
prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
126 CONC. RuE. 9461 (1980); see also A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1256.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 875 (1976).
89. Section 875 of the Restatement provides:
Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and
indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the
entire harm.
Id.; see aso W. PROSSER & W. KEaTON, THE LAw OF TORTS S 52, at 347 (5th ed. 1984) ("Where
two or more causes combine to produce such a single result, incapable of any reasonable division,
each may be a substantial factor in bringing about the loss, and if so, each is charged with all
of it.").
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SS 443(a), 881 (1976); see also W. PRossr
& W.
KEETON, supra note 89, S 52, at 348-52.
91. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS S 433(B) (1976).
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defendants.92 Courts recognize the difficulty of proving the liability of each
individual generator at a multigenerator site.9 3 Similar problems of causation
arise in CEROLA actions against landowners. Requiring the government to
prove each successive owner's percentage of harm would likely foreclose recovery
against such parties. All responsible parties are thus subject to joint and several
liability.
One might argue an innocent purchaser should not be subject to joint and
several liability inasmuch as he caused no harm and is liable only because of
his status as landowner. 4 Under CERLA, however, the present landowner is
deemed to have expanded the harm by failing to abate the hazardous waste
on his property. Because CERCLA requires responsible parties to bear cleanup
costs, joint and several liability must be available against all responsible parties
to further the goals of the Act. If liability extends to an innocent purchaser at
all, the liability must be joint and several.
D.

Affirmative Defenses

Innocent purchasers are exposed to both strict and joint and several liability
under CERCLA.95 Affirmative defenses available to successor landowners might
alleviate response cost liability.96 The defenses are narrow and require that the
hazardous waste release and attendant damages be caused by acts of war, acts
of God, or acts of an unrelated third party.97 The first two defenses are confined
98
to unusual circumstances and provide little relief for an innocent purchaser. 1
The third defense resembles the "intervening cause" defense and likely has
practical application in the case of successor landowner liability." J
92.

See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Il1. 1984);

United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). See generally Moore & Kowalski, supra note 79.
93. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 68-78.
95.

See supra text accompanying notes 68-94.

96. 42 U.S.C. $ 9607(b) (1982); see also FLA. STAT. S 403.727(5) (1985) (affirmative defenses
available include acts of war, government, God, or third parties).
97. 42 U.S.C. S 9607(b) (1982).
98. FLA. STAT. S 403.727(5Xb) (1985) provides an additional affirmative defense where it can
be shown that the alleged violation was solely the result of an act of government. This defense
may be of more practical use to an innocent purchaser but once again only under unusual circumstances.
99. See 42 U.S.C. S 9607(bX3) (1982); Bleicher & Stonelake, supra note 4, at 10,019-20. The
third-party defense provides an exception to liability for a release or threat of release caused solely
by:
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant,
or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship,
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant . . . if the defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foresecably result from such acts or omissions.
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Two courts have examined the third party defense in the context of successor
landowner liability."'" The opinions offer limited guidance in determining when
the defense is available. In an action against the current owner of a hazardous
waste site, the district court in United States v. Mirabile"" denied a motion for
2
summary judgment on the liability issue. 1'
Shortly after the defendant acquired
3
title to the property,"' the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (PDER) advised him that drums on the property contained hazardous
waste.1' 4 PDER asked the defendant to remove the drums."'" The defendant
commenced efforts to cleanup the site but did not remove the drums."'" PDER
undertook cleanup of the site and brought a cost recovery action against all
potentially responsible parties."'" The court held that a purchaser of property
on which hazardous waste is already present might be insulated from liability
pursuant to section 9607(b)(3) if he does not dispose of further waste and takes
steps to avoid further releases."'
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of third party defenses in New York
v. Shore Realty Corp. I" Shore, a land development corporation, acquired contaminated property despite knowledge of the prior disposal of hazardous wastes
on the site."' Tenants on the property disposed of wastes subsequent to Shore's
acquisition."' The court rejected Shore's third party defense, finding Shore liable
12
to the government for response costs under CERCLA.'
The Shore court suggested the contractual limitation of the third party defense
requires express attention to the environmental issue." 3 The court stated a
42 U.S.C. S 9607(bX3) (1982); see also FLA. STAT. S 403.727(5)(d) (1985) (third-party defense
available if defendant exercised due care and took precautions against foreseeable acts of third
parties).
100. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENrL. L. INST.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
101. 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENWrL. L. INST.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
102. Id. at 20,994.
103. A bank had acquired the property from a waste disposal company through foreclosure
and subsequent high bid at the sheriff's sale. The bank then assigned its bid to the defendants.
Id. at 20,993.
104. Id. Prior owners of the site had been engaged in the paint manufacturing business, and
the waste stream generated by the manufacturing operations had been stored in drums. 1. at
20,992. These drums were present on the site when the defendants acquired title. Id. at 20,993.
105. Id. at 20,993.
106. Id. The defendant collected the drums, which had been scattered about the site, and
placed them in a warehouse. The defendant obtained quotations from firms on the cost of removing
the drums, but no drums were actually removed. Id.
107. Id. The bank was among the named defendants, but the court held it not liable. The
court ruled that the bank had held title to the property for such a short period that it was an
owner within the meaning of CERCLA S 9601(20). Id. at 20,996.
108. Id. at 20,994. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding
material fact issues as to whether he had exercised due care to prevent further release of hazardous
waste. Id
109. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 1038-39.
111. Id. at 1039.
112. Id. at 1048-49.
113. Id. at 1048 n.23.
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purchaser cannot insulate himself from liability arising out of the vendor's
dumping if the contract contemplated the purchaser's assumption of some of
the previous owner's environmental liability.1 4 The court based its holding,
however, on its inability to determine who Shore claimed was the responsible
"third party.""15 The court reasoned that prior tenants, owners, and operators
fell outside the scope of section 9607(b)(3) because the acts or omissions referred
to in the statute must occur during the defendant's operation of the property."'
The court rejected Shore's argument as applied to the tenants because Shore
knew of the tenants' pre-closing activities and could have readily foreseen the
7
continued dumping of hazardous waste at the site."' The hazardous waste releases were not caused solely by the tenants, and Shore took no precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions.'
The two decisions appear to conflict regarding a subsequent purchaser's use
of the third party defense. The Shore rationale effectively bars the use of the
third party defense by an innocent purchaser, while the Mirabile decision exempts
an innocent purchaser from liability upon the showing of due care after the
discovery of the hazardous waste. The Shore court's interpretation of the defense,
limiting it to acts committed during the period of-ownership, is an unnecessary
manipulation of statutory language. The decision more appropriately rests on
Shore's contractual connection and failure to exercise due care. A common
sense reading of the statute suggests this conclusion. However, the statutory
language supports either court's position.
Section 9607(b)(3) was not specifically drafted to remedy the plight of an
innocent purchaser. Whether Congress' failure to provide a specific defense for
the innocent purchaser was the result of oversight, the intent that section
9607(b)(3) provide such a defense or the intent that an innocent purchaser bear
the entire cleanup cost is not clear. Unless, however, GERCLA is amended to
provide such a defense, the innocent purchaser's only potential shield against
liability is section 9607(b)(3).
E.

Contribution

An innocent purchaser's prospects of avoiding liability appear bleak. His
alternative is to shift the financial burden to other responsible parties. In theory,
"9
and jointly and sevthe innocent purchaser may be held both strictly liable
20
and several liability
costs.
Joint
response
erally liable for the entire amount of
enables the government to designate one responsible party as the defendant,
determine liability as to that defendant, and collect the total damages from
him.' 2 ' To the extent he is financially able to satisfy a judgment against him,

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id. at 1048-49.
Id. at 1049.

119.
120.
121.

See supra text accompanying notes 68-78.
See supra text accompanying notes 79-94.
See Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (D. Colo. 1985).
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the present property owner represents the easiest target for a cost recovery
action. Moreover, many district courts preclude one tortfeasor from compelling
the joinder of another in a CERCLA action.'2 2 Courts have ruled that joinder
is permissive rather than indispensable when liability is joint and several.I2 An
innocent purchaser is not foreclosed, however, from impleading and seeking
contribution from the vendor and other potentially responsible parties as third
24

party defendants.

Claims for contribution among parties may determine an innocent purchaser's ultimate responsibility.'2 5 In addition to third party claims against persons not joined by the government, contribution might be pursued in crossclaims against other defendants. An innocent purchaser might seek contribution
after the government was successful in a cost recovery action, where he alone
satisfied the government's claim. A claim for contribution may also arise after
an innocent purchaser settles with the government for the entire cleanup cost.
The innocent purchaser may then seek contribution against nonsettling responsible parties. Finally, an innocent purchaser may pursue contribution if the
vendor or other responsible parties settle with the government for less than the
entire cost of the cleanup, and the government subsequently brings suit against
the nonsettling defendants. As a responsible party, a subsequent purchaser would
himself be subject to claims for contribution by other parties originally bearing
the cost of cleanup.
The availability of contribution under CERCLA is not conclusively determined.' 26 Several courts have explicitly held contribution available under CER-

122. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1083 n.9 (D. Colo. 1985);
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1260-61 (S.D. Ill.
1984); United States
v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
123. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1083 n.9 (D. Colo. 1985); United
States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1260-61 (S.D. Il. 1984); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 845 n.26 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
124. Se Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 n.3 (D. Colo. 1985).
[The] appropriate procedure . . .is to implead a joint tortfeasor as a third-party defendant
under Rule 14, Fed. R. Civ. P. This procedural distinction should not obscure the main
point . . . a defendant subject to joint and several liability may bring other potentially
responsible parties into the suit in order to apportion liability.
Id.
125. For further discussion of contribution and apportionment issues under CERCLA, see
Smith, A Right to Contribution in Superfund Cost Recovery Actions, 8 CHEM. & RAD. WASTE LIT. REP.
41 (1984); Note, Right to Contribution Under CERCLA, supra note 79; Note, Apportionment and Contribution Under Superfund, supra note 79.
126. CERCLA does not expressly provide for a right of contribution among parties, although
some sections suggest such a right exists. See Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484,
1492 (D. Colo. 1985) ("Congress, [in S 9 60 7(aX 7 )] explicitly declared its intent to preserve actions
for contribution to the extent that the common law provides a right to such actions"). CERCLA's
legislative history suggests that Congress intended the right to contribution be developed by the
courts under traditional and evolving principles of federal common law. See 126 Coso. REo. 26,785
(1980) (statement by Representative Gore). No goal of CERCLA would be promoted by requiring
one of the responsible parties to bear the full cost of injuries caused if not wholly, at least in part,
by others. ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. at 1491. In fact, the EPA has argued that applying the con-
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CLA;'2 7 a number have also stated in dicta that the remedy is available.' 2 The
sole decision denying contribution under CERCLA 29 has been read as limited
to the proposition that a party liable under CERCLA cannot seek contribution
from a nonresponsible party under section 9607(a).'10
Courts will likely continue the trend toward establishing a federal common
law right to contribution under CERCLA. The right to contribution does not
release an innocent purchaser from liability. In future cases, courts must consider how damages should be allocated among the parties. CERCLA designates
four separate classes of responsible parties held strictly liable by status without
regard to fault.' Courts confront the difficult task of comparing fault among
parties who have performed dissimilar functions.
American courts have not established a uniform rule regarding equitable
apportionment in contribution. 3 2 Some states do not even recognize a right to
contribution.1 3 3 The majority have adopted one of the two methods the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides to assess the equitable shares of joint tortfeasors: (1) pro rata and (2) comparative fault.13 4 One of these approaches, 'or
a variation thereof, will likely be utilized to allocate damages under CERCLA.
The pro rata approach, or "equity is equality" rule, allocates damages
equally to each tortfeasor.' Cleanup costs would be divided by the number
of tortfeasors. Under this approach, an innocent purchaser would ultimately
bear the same amount of liability as the individual parties who created the
problem; he would be placed on equal footing with the vendor disposer. This
approach is simple to administer but offers little equity in relation to the actual
harm caused by each defendant. Consider the simple case of two responsible
parties, a vendor disposer and a subsequent purchaser. Each party would be

tribution doctrine is not only fair but also necessary for the implementation of the statute. See Note,
Right to Contribution Under CERCLA, supra note 79, at 355.
127. See Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985); United States
v. Ward, 14 ENvTL. L. REp. (ENvrL. L. INSr.) 20,804, at 20,806 (E.D.N.C. May 14, 1984);
Reilly Tar Corp. v. Burlington N. R.R., 589 F. Supp. 275, 286 (D. Minn. 1984); United States
v. Price, 14 ENvmL L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INst.) 20,501 (D.N.J. May 31, 1984).
1984);
128. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1261 (S.D. Ill.
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 845 n.26 (W.D. Mo. 1984); see
also Note, Right to Contribution Under CERCLA, supra note 79, at 359 n.105 (Chem-Dyn court noted
CERCLA $ 9607(eX2) provided for contribution, but viewed statute as relevant only in joint and
several liability context).
129. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 15 Erm. L. REP. (ENVYL. L. INST.)
20,483 (S.D. Ind. June 29, 1983). In Westinghouse, the defendant sought a third party complaint
against Monsanto Company, the manufacturer of PCBs. Id. at 20,484-85. The court found Monsanto was not a responsible party under CERCLA and held CERCLA did not create an action
for contribution for the defendant against Monsanto. Id.
130. Se Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
132. See W. PRossER & W. KEToN, supra note 89, S 50.
133. Id.
134. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF Toa's S 886A comment h (1979).
135. Id.
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responsible for fifty percent of the response costs. The unfairness is magnified
for the purchaser who acquired the property without knowledge of the prior
disposal of hazardous waste.
The second approach to contribution, comparative fault, is utilized in
Florida'1 6 and represents the trend in the law of contribution.

37

The legislative

history and goals of CERCLA, and federal court decisions in other contexts"',
suggest that courts are likely to apply comparative fault. In fashioning a method
of apportionment, it remains uncertain whether state forum law should apply
or whether federal rules applicable to all cases should be created by federal
courts. Courts will probably adopt uniform federal rules to avoid diverse state
laws and potential conflict of law issues. Since Florida employs the comparative
fault doctrine, the issue need not be resolved for this discussion. Comparative
fault would be used in an action based on either state law or CERCLA.
The doctrine of comparative fault dictates that liability be apportioned according to each party's relative fault. 39 Although the method employs concepts
familiar to courts (i.e., negligence and recklessness), difficulty arises in its application to CERCLA, which bases liability on status rather than conduct.
Because parties in waste disputes perform dissimilar functions, a reasonable
basis for apportionment cannot be readily established. While credible approaches
have been suggested' ° for allocating relative fault among generators, no reasonable approach has been suggested for equitable allocation among the many
potential classes of responsible parties often involved in the disposal of hazardous
waste. Courts will probably allocate liability among parties based on equity and
the factual circumstances of each case.
Due to these complexities, a court confronting multiple defendants should
initially apportion liability among the four classes: owners, -operators, generators
and transporters. The court would then allocate liability within each class. Under
this approach, the court compares an innocent purchaser's fault only with that
of prior owners. Liability between owners is then determined based on common
law principles of nuisance, fraud, negligence, and contract.
III.

A.

CAVEAT EMPTOR

Duty to Disclose

The existence of hazardous waste on otherwise marketable property may
produce 'severe consequences for actual or even potential purchasers.' 4' In the
case of an innocent purchaser, the discovery of hazardous waste subjects him
to significant unbargained-for liability. In addition to the responsibility for cleanup

136.
137.
138.
Airlines,
139.
140.
141.

See FLA.

STAT.

S 768.31 (1985).

OF ToRTs S 886A comment h (1979).
See, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Kohr v. Allegheny
Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. dnied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 886A comment h (1979).
See supra note 87.
See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)
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costs and the diminished resale value of his property, the purchaser faces potential liability to adjoining landowners and other third parties. While the responsible party should bear the cost of hazardous waste cleanup, the burden
is transferred to the purchaser under the doctrine of caveat emptor. Caveat
42
emptor remains applicable to realty sales in every common law jurisdiction.'
Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes the prevailing view of vendor liability:
Under the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, the original rule was
that, in the absence of express agreement, the vendor of land was not
liable to vendee, or a fortiori to any other person, for the condition of
the land existing at the time of transfer. As to sales of land this rule
has retained much of its original force, and the implied warranties which
have grown up around the sale of chattels never have developed. This
is perhaps because great importance always has been attached to the
deed of conveyance, which is taken to represent the full agreement of
the parties, and to exclude all other terms and liabilities. The vendee
is required to make his own inspection of the premises, and the vendor
is not responsible43 to him for their defective condition, existing at the
time of transfer.

Exceptions to caveat emptor have evolved,' 44 but the extent to which they
apply to hazardous waste is unclear. In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 145
the Third Circuit held that under caveat emptor the vendor was not liable to
4
the purchaser (PECO) in private nuisance for hazardous waste on the land.' "
In an arm's length transaction where both parties possess equal means of knowledge about the land, the court concluded, the seller is liable only for express
judicial exceptions
provisions in the contract of sale. 4 7 The court acknowledged
48
to the rule but held they did not apply in this case.'
Prior to purchase PECO inspected the site, inquired into its past use, and

142. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty - Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND.
L. REv. 541, 543 (1961); see also M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY
S 1.2(n), at 37 (4th ed. 1984) ("In the ordinary sale of realty this doctrine [caveat emptor] not
only applies, it flourishes").
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 352 comment a (1965).
144. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 1985) ("A
number of general exceptions to the rule of caveat emptor, mostly dealing with liability for personal
injuries or property damage resulting from latent dangerous conditions, have been recognized");
Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1985) ("the tendency of the more recent cases has
been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor").
145. 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985).
146. Id. at 315.
147. Id. at 312.
[I]n the absence of fraud or misrepresentation a vendor is responsible for the quality of
property being sold by him only to the extent for which he expressly agrees to be responsible
...
. The theory of the doctrine is that the buyer and seller deal at arm's length, each
with an equal means of knowledge concerning the subject of the sale, and that therefore
the buyer should be afforded only those protections for which he specifically contracts.
Id. (quoting Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 124, 288 A.2d 771, 774-75 (1972)).
148. Id. at 313.
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learned of numerous spills on the property. 49' The court evaluated PECO's
sophisticated purchase practices and found it inconceivable that PECO's offer
price did not reflect the possibility of environmental risks.'5 The court refused,
in the absence of fraudulent concealment, to negate the market's allocation of
risks and resources, and disallowed the vendee's private nuisance action for
conditions existing on the transferred land. 15'
The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would subject vendors, who may
have originally sold their land at discounted prices, to unbargained-for liability
to remote vendors. 5 2 Philadelphia Electric stands as a strong impediment to recovery actions by subsequent purchasers on common law theories. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, however, recognized an exception to the strict application
of caveat emptor in State Department of Environmental Protection v. Vertron Corp.''
In a dispute involving hazardous substances, the doctrine gave way to the theory
of fraudulent nondisclosure in the sale of realty. 54 The court relied on home
sale cases for the elements necessary to prove fraudulent concealment by a
vendor of realty. The seller must deliberately conceal or fail to disclose a material fact or defect not readily observable by the purchaser; the buyer must
detrimentally rely on the seller.'55
In Vertron, the court regarded toxic contamination of land as a latent defect.'""
While the purchasers knew they were buying a chemical company, they were
unaware of the contamination. '57 The vendor knew of the contamination but
intentionally failed to disclose it to the purchase. "" The court held the purchasers
entitled to recovery of any proven diminution in the land's fair market value,
the cost of a newly-installed containment system, and legal fees incurred by
the purchaser in defense of the action.' 59
Vertron imposes a duty upon sellers of real property to disclose the presence
of hazardous waste to buyers. Some courts maintain that mere nondisclosure
does not constitute fraudulent concealment if parties deal at arm's length and

149.

Id. at 314.

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153.
154.

94 NJ. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983).
Id. at 503-04, 468 A.2d at 166. See generally Comment, Torts

Property - Environmental
Law - Landowners Who Use or Permit Others to Use Their Property for Toxic Waste Disposal Are Strictly
Liable for the Resulting Damage, State Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.,
15 RUTGERS L.J. 833 (1984).
155. 94 N.J. at 503-04, 468 A.2d at 166 (citing Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 317
A.2d 68 (1974); Berman v. Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 458 A.2d 1311 (Oh. Div. 1981), asf'd,
189 N.J. Super. 49, 458 A.2d 1289 (App. Div. 1983), cert. denied, 94 N.J. 549, 468 A.2d 197

(1983)).
156.

Id. at 504, 468 A.2d at 166. The contamination consisted of mercury pollution in the

soil. Id.
157. Id. at 485, 468 A.2d at 156.
158. Id. at 504, 468 A.2d at 166.
159. Id. The lower court found the purchasers were not subject to liability to the government
for cleanup costs, and this issue was not raised on appeal. Id. at 493, 468 A.2d at 160.
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have equal opportunity to access and examine the facts.160 This notion held
true in Florida until 1985. In Johnson v. Davis,161 the Florida Supreme Court
held that a home seller who knows of facts that materially affect the property
value which are neither readily observable nor known to the buyer, must disclose
the facts.162 The court regarded this duty as equally applicable to all forms of
real property new and used. 163 Although Johnson may arguably be confined to
the sale of homes, similar policy considerations support extending the court's
t
rationale to the sale of property containing hazardous waste."6
B.

Breach of Warranty

Express contractual provisions may also preempt the doctrine of caveat emptor. With regard to the discovery of hazardous waste, however, real estate
contracts typically lack representations and warranties sufficient to establish liability against the vendor in favor of an innocent purchaser. 6 ' Such agreements
generally focus on loss arising from defects in legal title. 66 Agreements conveying
land by deed containing the usual covenants for title contemplate that the deed
will contain the covenants of seisin, right to convey, against encumbrances,
quiet enjoyment and warranty. 67 Assuming the vendor passes good title, only
the covenant against emcumbrances potentially gives rise to an action by the
innocent purchaser against the vendor.
The covenant against encumbrances is a representation that there are no
encumbrances against the property. 68 It guarantees to the purchaser the property is not subject to outstanding rights or interests that would diminish the
value of the land.' 6 The term "encumbrance" is arguably broad enough to
include the presence of hazardous substances. In United States v. Allied Chemical
Corp.,"" however, the only court to address this issue ruled the term "encumbrance" does not extend to hazardous waste.' M The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that physical conditions such as the presence of hazardous

160. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1985).
161. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
162. Id. at 629.
163. Id. For a general discussion of purchaser recovery for latent defects in real property, see
Bearman, supra note 142; Dunham, Vendor's Obligations as to Fitness of Land for a ParticularPurpose,
37 MINN. L. REv. 108 (1953); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1953);
Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of Red Estate - The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, 22 DEPAUL
L. REV. 510 (1972).

164. For a general discussion of Johnson v. Davis, see Comment, Real Property Law: Seller's Duty
to Disclose Material Fats in Used Homes Sales: Overdue or Overprotection?, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. (1986).
165. See Bleicher & Stonelake, supra note 4, at 10,023.
166. See id.
167. See R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 455 (3d ed. 1981); W. BURRY, REAL
PROPERTY 313 (3d ed. 1965).
168. See generally W. BURBY, supra note 167, at 314-15.
169. See R. BoVER, supra note 167, at 455-56.
170. 14 ENvmL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INsT.) 20,519 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 1984).
171. Id. at 20,520.
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waste constitute encumbrances if not visible or known at the time of convey72

ance. 1

The Allied court correctly observed that no authority existed for extending
the covenant against encumbrances to include hazardous waste. 7 3 The term
"encumbrance" has traditionally been identified with liens, mortgages, easements, profits, restrictive covenants and other such third-party interests in or
rights to the land. 7 4 Encumbrances thus affect ownership rights.' 75 The presence
of hazardous waste on property does not create an interest in favor of a third
party. A subsequent purchaser's eventual liability to the government for cleanup
costs through judgment, statutory lien, or injunction does not create an outstanding right at the time of conveyance; accordingly, a breach of the covenant
against encumbrances does not arise.
Unless a sales contract expressly warrants against hazardous waste contamination, an innocent purchaser is not likely to succeed on a cause of action
based on contract. Other common law causes of action have proven equally
ineffective. 76 In the absence of fraudulent concealment, an innocent purchaser's
common law remedies against the vendor of a hazardous waste site appear
limited.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Evans v. Faught, 231 Cal. App. 2d 698, 706, 42 Cal. Rptr. 133,'137 (1965));
see also W. BURBY, supra note 167, at 314-15.
175. See W. BURBY, supra note 167, at 314-15.
176. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985) (subsequent
purchaser did not have viable cause of action in private or public nuisance or common law indemnity); Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (subsequent purchaser's common law claims barred by statute of limitations; court stating
in dicta private nuisance and strict liability would fail on merits). The common law cause of action
most frequently associated with environmental lawsuits is nuisance. Generally, federal statutory law
requiring pollution abatement has developed from or codified the common law of nuisance. A
nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land. W. PROssER & W. KEETON, supra
note 89, 5 87, at 619. Generally, the creator of a nuisance is liable for the resulting damages,
and ordinarily, his liability continues for as long as the nuisance continues. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts S 840A (1979).
A subsequent innocent purchaser would have no standing to bring a cause of action in public
nuisance against a vendor. See PhiladelphiaElectric, 762 F.2d at 315-16. However, there may be an
argument that a former landowner-polluter is liable to a subsequent purchaser for cleanup costs
under a theory of private nuisance. At least one district court has allowed such a cause of action
to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See United States v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 14 ENVTL. L. REp. (ErvTL. L. INST.) 20,519, at 20,521 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 1984). However,
no case has ever allowed a purchaser of real property to recover on the private nuisance theory
from a seller for conditions existing on the land transferred. In fact, two courts have addressed
the issue and determined that no cause of action in private nuisance exists under such circumstances.
See Philadelphia Electric, 762 F.2d at 315; Pinole Point, 586 F. Supp. at 292 n.5.
A private nuisance is defined as a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private
use and enjoyment of land. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTs $ 821D (1979). Both the Philadelphia
Electric and Pinole Point courts interpreted private nuisance to require a violation of the rights of
the owner of another piece of land. PhiladelphiaElectric, 762 F.2d at 314; Pinole Point, 596 F. Supp.
at 292 n.5. The Philadelphia Electric court also held that the purchaser could not recover for the
violation of a duty owed to others - namely its neighbors. 762 F.2d at 314. The reasoning of
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IV.

STATUTORY PURCHASER CLAIMS

A.

CERCLA Private Cause of Action

Although his common law remedies are uncertain, an innocent purchaser
may nonetheless choose to voluntarily clean up his site. He may wish to make
the land suitable for other uses, or simply to limit his own liability.177 Under
CERCLA, an innocent purchaser can begin cleanup and later sue to recover
costs from other responsible parties, including the prior owner. If the purchaser
instead waits until after the government's suit to seek contribution from other
responsible parties, the problem may have expanded.
The overwhelming majority of courts hold that CERCLA permits a private
right of action. 7 1 Section 9607(a)(4XB) creates this right against responsible
parties for recovery of necessary response costs incurred by "any other person,"
consistent with the National Contingency Plan. '8° The expenditure of private
cleanup funds does not guarantee the right to a private cause of action under
CERCLA. As a potentially responsible party, an innocent purchaser must de'
termine- whether he may avail himself of the cost recovery action. ""
Courts split on whether potentially liable parties may bring cost recovery

the two courts is sound. Should a third party bring a nuisance suit against the purchaser, the
vendor may yet be liable for the damages. However, the vendor is not liable to the purchaser.
This result is consistent with the historical purpose of private nuisance law as a means of efficiently
resolving conflicts between neighboring contemporaneous land uses.
177. See 126 CONG. REc. 26,338 (1980) (remarks of Representative Florio). Congressman Florio
stated: "Although costs will vary significantly from site to site, one principle will operate at all
sites - the sooner action is taken, the lower the costs will be. Early containment simply means
less to clean up." Id.
178. See 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a) (1982); infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
179. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1985); Artesian
Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1355-57 (D. Del. 1985);
Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-44 (S.D. Fla. 1984);
Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-44 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 293 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Thomas, Municipal and Private Party
Claims Under Superfund, 13 ENVrL. L. REP. (EVrrL. L. INST.) 10,272 (1983); Comment, supra note
15.
180. See Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985); see also supra
text accompanying note 27.
181. Additionally, an innocent purchaser must determine whether his cleanup activities are
consistent with the NCP. Compliance with this requirement has been at issue in several cases. See,
e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del.
1985); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984). Litigating
consistency with the NCP focuses on the extent to which government direction is necessary before
a private party may act under section 9607. Some courts have held a private cost recovery action
does not require government approval of cleanup. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Other courts have held there can be
no private claim absent direct governmental approval. See, e.g., Bulk Distribution Centers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 586 F. Supp. 1437, 1446 (S.D. Fla. 1984). The uncertainty of the consistency
requirement necessitates that an innocent purchaser seek government approval prior to instituting
cleanup activities.
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actions. In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 112 the defendant allegedly
dumped hazardous waste at a city landfill. 8 The city undertook the cleanup
and sought recovery from the defendant under section 9607.1" Because the city
was potentially liable under CERCLA as the owner of the dump site, the
defendant insisted the city could not satisfy the definition of "any other person."' The district court concluded that a land owner who independently cleans
up his site may recover cleanup costs pursuant to section 9607(a)(4)(B), despite
his own potential liability under section 9607(a).""' Emphasizing the nonculpability of the site owner, the court sought to advance the statutory purpose of
facilitating prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites."'7
Many jurisdictions have followed Stepan and its rationale has been extended
to subsequent purchasers. In Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,""' the
court permitted a subsequent purchaser who discovered he bought a hazardous
waste site to sue the prior owner under section 9607(a)(4)(B).18" The court noted
the nonculpable landowner would otherwise be precluded from recovering cleanup
costs. 190

Other courts have addressed the standing issue quite differently. In D'Imperio
v. United States,'9 the court dismissed a declaratory judgment action brought
under section 9607(aX4)(B), holding that recovery must be preceded by proof
that the plaintiff was not liable for cleanup costs.92 Likewise, in Velsicol Chemical
Corp. v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp.,"'1 the court relied on Stepan and denied
dismisgal of a declaratory judgment action brought by the property purchaser
against the seller.9 4 The purchaser sought to establish the vendor's liability for
the disposal of coal tar sludge in a holding tank located on the property.1"5
The court narrowly interpreted Stepan, noting the plaintiff's knowledge of the
coal tar tank was in dispute. The plaintiff correctly observed the dispositive
consideration in Stepan was that the plaintiff city neither operated a hazardous
waste disposal facility on the premises nor voluntarily permitted hazardous substances on its property. 9 6 The court relied on the plaintiff's possible nonculpability, an issue properly to be resolved at trial.19'
Another court applied the doctrine of clean hands to deny a plaintiff's private

182.
183.
184.

544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1139-40.

185.
186.
187.

Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1142-43.
Id.

188.

596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984).

189.
190.

Id. at 291.
Id.

191.

575 F. Supp. 248 (D.NJ. 1983).

192.
193.

Id. at 253.
15 ENVTL. L. REP.

194.

Id. at 20,105.

(ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,103 (E.D. Tcnn. Aug. 16, 1984).

195. Id.
196. Id. at 20,105-06.
197.

Id. at 20,105.
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cost recovery action. In Mardan Corp. v. C. G.C. Music, Ltd., 'sMardan bought
a musical instrument manufacturing business from C.G.C. The site included
a settling lagoon for manufacturing process waste.2 1 1' Mardan used the waste
lagoon until the company entered into a Consent Agreement and Final Order
with EPA requiring the lagoon's closure.21" Mardan subsequently sought recovery of closure costs from C.G.C. 21 2 The court rendered summary judgment
in favor of C.G.C. ' "- Reasoning that section 9607 actions are equitable actions
in the nature of restitution, the court applied the clean hands doctrine. "4 Although the defendants may have produced the majority of hazardous waste
material, recovery was barred because Mardan also contributed to the creation
2
of hazardous waste. 05
The decisions do not create a clear basis for determining a subsequent
owner's ability to bring suit. A number of courts preclude owners who contribute to the disposal of hazardous waste from recovering their subsequent
cleanup costs. These opinions do not bar cost recovery actions by innocent
purchasers. A contrary reading of the pertinent decisions would conflict with
CERCLA's goal of prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Private cleanup is encouraged by the Act. The removal of an innocent landowner's
right to recover from more culpable parties would effectively eliminate the incentive to undertake a private cleanup. CERCLA's private cause of action may
prove to be an innocent purchaser's only remedy. Common law remedies are
precarious, and Florida provides no statutory cause of action."'i Assuming CERCLA's private cause of action is available to an innocent purchaser, appor2 17
tionment problems again arise.
B.

"As Is"

The sales contract may present an additional obstacle to actions by purchasers. Although sales contracts generally lack reference to vendor liability for
land conditions at the time of the sale," 5 contracts frequently provide for the
conveyance of land "as is." The general effect of the clause is to disclaim
representations by the seller as to the particular condition, fitness, type of construction, etc. of the premises." 9 If a contract contains an "as is" clause, the

198.
199.
200.
201.

600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984).
Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id.

202. Id.
203. Id. at 1058.
204. Id. at 1057-58 (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579
F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).

205. Id. at 1058.
206. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 132-40.
208. See supra text accompanying note 164.
209. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (D. Ariz. 1984)
(quoting Defendants' Memorandum citing Approved Properties, Inc. v. City of New York, 52
Misc. 2d 956, 958, 277 N.Y.S.2d 236, 238 (Sup. Ct. 1966)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII

contract is not likely to be construed to impose liability against the vendor on
a theory of warranty against contamination.2 1 It is less clear, however, to what
extent an "as is" clause insulates a prior owner from subsequent cleanup liability.
CERCLA expressly precludes an "as is" clause from barring the prior owner
from liability under federal CERCLA claims. 2 1' The Act does not bar such a
clause from establishing liability for cleanup costs between vendor and purchaser, 2 2 a relevant consideration in suits for contribution and apportionment,
as well as, private cost recovery actions. In Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music,
Ltd.,2 " a vendor conveyed property subject to an "as is" clause.214 The purchaser, who knew of the original contamination and contributed to the hazardous waste,2 15 cleaned up the site pursuant to a Consent Agreement and Final
Order with EPA.2 16 The purchaser then brought suit against the vendor under
CERCLA's private cause of action. "' 7 Holding the "as is" clause did not defeat
the purchaser's recovery, 218 the court ruled the warranty disclaimer precluded
2'9
only causes of action based on breach of warranty.
V.

INNOCENT PURCHASERS

CERCLA's cleanup liability scheme is ambiguous and unclear. Although
courts have shaped CERCLA more than any other federal pollution statute, 21"
basic questions concerning liability will likely remain in doubt for many years
to come. One principle, however, is fundamentally clear: CERCLA imposes
absolute liability on the present owner of a contaminated site. A subsequent
owner is subject to cleanup cost liability despite his unknowing acquisition of
a previous owner's dumpsite.2 2 ' Courts have not yet fleshed out whether an
210. 42 U.S.C. S 9607(e) (1982).
211. Cf id. (liability under CERCLA may not be transferred to another by agreement).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 135-40.
213. 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984).
214. Id. at 1055. The clause provided:
Purchaser acknowledges that neither Conn [C.G.C. Music] nor Macmillan [parent corporation of C.G.C. Music] is making any representations or warranties, expressed or
implied, about the condition of the Assets (including the Fee Simple Assets) or the Leased
Assets, and that the sale and/or Sublease thereof will be strictly "AS IS." Conn and
MacMillan EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES AS TO THE ASSETS, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
OR OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Id. (emphasis in original).
215. Id. at 1052.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1055. "he court did rule, however, that a Settlement Agreement and Release
entered into by the parties was effective to bar all claims which the parties had reasonably contemplated and intended to resolve at the time of execution. Id. at 1056. The court noted dfendant's
claim that plaintiff had raised, discussed, pressed and eventually conceded its hazardous waste
disposal claim. Id. at 1055.
219. Id.
220. See Comment, CERCLA 1985: A Litigation Update, 15 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
10,395 (1985).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 68-78.
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innocent purchaser may assert a third party defense,22 2 a claim against a prior

24
owner2 -' for contribution, or some other common law or statutory theory.
The government policy in bringing a cost recovery action is to join as many
potentially responsible parties as is practicable. 2 5 In any recovery action the
present owner represents the easiest and surest source of recovery. In CERCLA's complex scheme, an innocent purchaser could be responsible for the
entire cleanup amount on a joint and several liability theory.22" This cost frequently exceeds the purchase price of the property. 227 In many cases, the landowner's failure to shift partial liability to other responsible parties may cause
his bankruptcy.228 Courts and commentators have expressed concern that the

harshness of both strict and joint and several liability of an innocent landowner

2
contravenes the congressional intent of establishing a fair liability system. 19
Congress designed CERCLA to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous
waste sites by placing the ultimate financial responsibility on those parties responsible for hazardous waste.2 " Hazardous waste cleanup is an important gov-

ernment activity that directly benefits the public. 23 1 Congress recognized the cost
of this benefit should be borne by parties creating the burden.2 -12 A senate report
aptly stated this intent:
Society should not bear the costs of protecting the public from hazards

produced in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dumpsite
owner or operator who has profited or otherwise benefited from commerce involving these substances and now wishes to be insulated from
any continuing responsibilities
for the present hazards to society that
23
have been created. -

222. See supra text accompanying notes 95-118.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 119-40.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 141-76.
225. Address by Steven D. Ramsey, supra note 8.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 79-94.
227. See supra text accompanying note 6.
228. See generally Drabkin, Moorman & Kirsch, Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste:
Caveat Creditor, 15 EVmL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 10,168 (1985).
229. See generally Note, Successor Landowner Liability for Environmental Torts: Robbing Peter to Pay
Paul?, 13 RuTGERs L.J. 329 (1982); Comment, supra note 4.
230. See Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
231. See Comment, supra note 4, at 193. The primary benefit of hazardous waste cleanup is
the protection of drinking water and the environment from contamination. Proper cleanup of hazardous waste is crucial to Florida because Florida is one of the few states in the country that relies
almost entirely on groundwater to meet its water needs. It is estimated that nine of every ten
Floridians get their drinking water from aquifers. Additionally, 20% of Florida's population drinks
untreated water drawn directly from wells. See Gainesville Sun, Mar. 1, 1986, at 15A, col. 1.
232. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 841
(W.D. Mo. 1984) ("Congress rationally considered the imposition of liability for the effects of past
disposal practices as a means to spread the costs of the cleanup on those who created and profited
from the waste"); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
("There is little doubt that Congress intended for those individuals who were responsible for creating
the hazards from these wastes to bear the cost of the clean up").
233. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1980); see also United States v. Shell Oil

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII

Imposing liability upon an innocent landowner who did not contribute to the
creation of the waste site is inconsistent with the policy underlying CERCLA
4
and fundamental equitable and legal principles.V
An innocent purchaser neither bargains for nor assumes the risk of hazardous
waste cleanup. Subjecting him to liability creates inequities similar to those
guarded against by notice requirements of recording statutes. 23 5 Innocent purchasers have long been protected in American commerce.2 3 6 Although the innocent purchaser may be better positioned to abate the problem, he is no more
culpable than his innocent neighboring landowners. Rather than impose an
undue burden on innocent landowners when responsible parties are unavailable,
Superfund or a comparable state trust should be utilized.
When successor landowners purchase land with knowledge of its hazardous
waste problems, however, liability may be appropriate. The landowners can
negotiate a favorable purchase price based upon knowledge of the hazardous
waste. If allowed to avoid liability, knowledgable purchasers may reap a windfall
equal to the difference between the purchase price of the land and its fair
market value when cleansed of toxic chemicals.
VI.

PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION

An innocent purchaser of contaminated property should not bear hazardous
waste cleanup costs unless he expressly assumes that responsibility from the
vendor. Both CERCLA and Florida law permit the imposition of cleanup cost
liability based solely on the ownership of land.

37

While some successor land-

owners will avoid undue cleanup cost liability, the innocent purchaser's opportunities for shifting liability are complex and uncertain. In addressing the
dilemma, Congress and Florida legislators should seriously consider the potentially bankrupting consequences for a purchaser who discovers hazardous materials on his newly-acquired property.
Sound measures are available to protect purchasers and the public interest.
Innocent landowners should be exempt from liability under CERCLA and
RRMA. Minnesota followed this approach with the Minnesota Environmental

Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985) (CERCLA seeks to place liability on proper segment
of society).
234. See Mott, Liability for Cleanup of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 15 NAT. RESOURCES
LAw 379, 414 (1982).
[Wlith the possible exception of [CERCLA], it is generally held that "mere ownership"

of a site is not enough to establish liability. Thus the innocent purchaser of an inactive
site, who unknowingly acquires buried drums, contaminated soil, or polluted groundwater,
has been protected from the severe consequences of liability for previous owner's conduct.
Id. But see New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (arguing that
allowing a current owner of a site to avoid liability merely by having purchased the site after
chemical dumping had ceased would open a huge loophole in CERCLA's coverage).
235.

See generally G.

THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

SS

4290-4291 (1963).
236. Id.
237.

See supra text accompanying notes 68-78.
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Response and Liability Act (MERLA), z'8 the most aggressive and comprehensive
legislative initiative to address hazardous waste problems.2"3 9 MERLA exempts
a landowner from liability unless he "knew or reasonably should have known
that a hazardous substance was located in or on the facility at the time right,
title, or interest in the property was first acquired by the person and engaged
in conduct by which he associated himself with the release.' 2 41 A written warranty, representation or undertaking set forth in a conveyance or recorded
2
instrument is admissible on the issue of knowledge. 41
Congress and Florida should adopt MERLA's exemption for innocent purchasers. The exemption should exclude purchasers who know of the hazardous
waste, even though they disassociate themselves from the release. By acquiring
the property with knowledge of the hazardous waste, a purchaser will likely be
able to negotiate a favorable purchase price. A cleanup for which he bears no
financial responsibility will likely produce a windfall profit for the knowledgeable
purchaser.
The innocent purchaser defense should be contingent upon the purchaser's
immediate notification of EPA or the proper state authority (FDER) upon the
discovery of hazardous waste. This requirement could be governed by a provision disallowing the defense if an innocent purchaser significantly contributed
to the release after he knew or reasonably should have known of the presence
of hazardous substances.2 42 Failure to report releases of hazardous waste may
result in unnecessary additional environmental damage sufficient to justify the
imposition of liability.2 43
At the state level, Florida should recognize the public detriment in allowing
the sale of properties containing hazardous wastes to unsuspecting buyers.2 44
The sole beneficiary is the unscrupulous vendor. State law should require a
vendor with knowledge of preexisting hazardous waste to disclose such information to a prospective buyer. Policy considerations favor a judicial exception
to the doctrine of caveat emptor for failure to disclose the presence of hazardous
waste on the property. Case precedent suggests an action in fraudulent misrepresentation.2 15 In a state with critical environmental concerns246 and high
volume real estate transactions, hazardous waste liability is more appropriately
addressed by the legislature on general policy grounds. In addition, the judiciary
2 47
may be reluctant to enter the hazardous waste fray absent legislative directive.

238. MINN. STAT. ANN. SS 115B.01-.24 (West Supp. 1985). See generally Ulan, Hester & Johnson, supra note 50.
239. See Ulan, Hester & Johnson, supra note 50, at 10,109.
240. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 115B.03(3Xd) (West Supp. 1985).

241. Id. 5 115B.03(3).
242. See, e.g., id. S 115B.03(3Xc).
243. See supra text accompanying note 177.
244. See Bleicher & Stonelake, supra note 4, at 10,022.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 153-64.
246. See supra note 231.
247. "[A]n extension of common law doctrine is particularly hazardous in an area, such as
environmental pollution, where Congress and the state legislatures are actively seeking to achieve
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By requiring a vendor to give notice in the deed of hazardous waste on
the premises, the legislature could promote a fair bargained-for exchange. 245 A
statutory warranty against hazardous waste is another alternative. Absent an
express waiver, the warranty would impose liability upon a vendor for hazardous
waste abatement or rescission unless the subsequent purchaser expressly assumed
responsibility for hazardous substances previously deposited on the property.
Such provisions are desirable with or without an innocent purchaser's affirmative
defense. Absent a defense these safeguards take on added significance.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In many real estate transactions, vendors convey unknown and unquantifiable potential hazardous waste liability with the property. State and federal
statutes impose strict liability on landowners for hazardous waste abatement.
An innocent purchaser of contaminated property may be liable for all cleanup
costs. Due to uncertain defenses and remedies, the discovery of hazardous waste
on newly-acquired land places substantial liability on a nonculpable party. Congress and the state legislatures should examine this injustice. Pending remedial
legislation, purchasers of real property should be aware of the potential of
acquiring major hazardous waste liability and should safeguard their interests
by giving careful consideration to the accompanying risks.T
JOHN

H.

(BUDDY)

DYER, JR.

a socially acceptable definition of rights and liabilities." Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,
762 F.2d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 1985).
248. A similar requirement is mandated under Pennsylvania law. See 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
5 6018.405 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
t Funding for superfund expired Sept. 30, 1985. At the date of publication, Congress was
considering renewal legislation. SetH.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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